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INTRODUCTION 
The shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri on August 9, 2014 
renewed debate over whether racial stereotypes about Black men as dangerous, 
violent criminals encourage police officers and armed civilians to shoot unarmed 
Black men in cases where they would not have used deadly force had the victim 
been White.1 Two diametrically opposed accounts of what happened emerged in 
* Cynthia Lee is the Charles Kennedy Poe Research Professor of Law at The George Washington
University Law School. She is the author of Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the Criminal 
Courtroom (2003) and coauthor (with Angela Harris) of Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (3d ed. 2014). 
She thanks Nancy Kim, Anna Roberts, and Tania Tetlow for helpful comments on this Article. She 
thanks Lesliediana Jones, Lam Nguyen, and Matthew Halldorson for excellent research assistance on 
this Article. She thanks Micah Morris of the UC Irvine Law Review for excellent editorial assistance on 
this Article. She also thanks Elizabeth Moulton for administrative assistance on this Article. 
1. I purposely capitalize the letter “B” in “Black” and “W” in “White” to acknowledge the fact
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the weeks following the shooting. Brown’s friend, Dorian Johnson, who was with 
Brown at the time Brown was shot, claimed Officer Darren Wilson shot Brown for 
no reason and continued shooting even after Brown turned around with his hands 
in the air, trying to show the officer that he was unarmed.2 In contrast, Officer 
Wilson said he shot Brown in self-defense after a scuffle in which Brown shoved 
him into his patrol car and attempted to grab his weapon.3 
Polls taken shortly after the shooting showed a racial divide in public opinion 
over whether the officer was justified in shooting Brown with fifty-seven percent 
of Blacks saying they believed the shooting was unjustified and only eighteen 
percent of Whites with the same opinion.4 When protests erupted in Ferguson, 
Missouri over the shooting, the police responded with an unusually heavy-handed 
display of force.5 Again, public opinion was split over whether the protesters or the 
police acted inappropriately.6  
One question that prosecutors face in highly charged cases with racial 
overtones like the Ferguson case is whether to attempt to conduct voir dire into 
that Black and White are socially constructed racial categories. See IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY 
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 9–10 (1996). 
2. Eliott C. McLaughlin, What We Know About Michael Brown’s Shooting, CNN (Aug. 15, 2014,
12:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-ferguson-michael-brown-what-we-know 
[http://perma.cc/SK6Y-YMZ8].  
3. Julia Talanova, Support Grows for Darren Wilson, Officer Who Shot Ferguson Teen Michael Brown,
CNN (Sept. 8, 2014, 7:11 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-
support [http://perma.cc/72HL-H5MH]; see also Julie Bosman et al., Amid Conflicting Accounts, Trusting 
the Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2014, at A1 (reporting that Officer Wilson told the grand jury that 
Michael Brown reached into his police vehicle and fought him for his gun). An investigation into the 
shooting by the U.S. Department of Justice found that the physical and forensic evidence supported 
Officer Wilson’s claim of self-defense and that the officer shot Brown as Brown was moving toward 
the officer. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO 
THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN 
WILSON 5–8 (2015). 
4. Reactions to the Shooting in Ferguson, Mo., Have Sharp Racial Divides, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/21/us/ferguson-poll.html. The reaction of many 
African Americans to the shooting likely reflected their distrust of police given a long history of 
antagonistic police-citizen interactions in Ferguson, Missouri. After a five-month long investigation, 
from September 4, 2014 to March 4, 2015, the Department of Justice found significant evidence of 
racial bias, both implicit and explicit, in the Ferguson Police Department and criminal justice system. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 62–63, 70–78 
(2015). 
5. Joe Coscarelli, Why Cops in Ferguson Look Like Soldiers: The Insane Militarization of America’s Police,
N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 14, 2014, 12:29 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/08/insane-
militarization-police-ferguson.html [http://perma.cc/NS5P-JPPC] (noting that the law-enforcement 
response to civilian protests against Michael Brown’s death involved tear gas, flash grenades, and 
military-style rifles). 
6. A YouGov poll found that forty-eight percent of Whites believed the protests were
unreasonable compared to thirty-one percent of Blacks. Peter Moore, Ferguson, MO.: Racial and Political 
Divide over Brown Shooting, YOUGOV (Aug. 18, 2014, 8:01 AM), http://today.yougov.com/news/2014/
08/18/ferguson-mo [http://perma.cc/N2SZ-GFBF] (referring to poll results at http://cdn.yougov
.com/cumulus_uploads/document/ou4yi1g0z8/tabs_HP_police_20140817-2.pdf). The same poll 
found thirty-four percent of Whites believed the police response to the Ferguson protests to be 
reasonable compared to only sixteen percent of Blacks with the same opinion. Id. 
Lee_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 11/25/2015  3:36 PM
2015] A NEW APPROACH TO VOIR DIRE ON RACIAL BIAS 845 
racial bias.7 Voir dire is the process of questioning prospective jurors to ensure that 
those chosen to sit on the jury will be impartial and unbiased. As Neil Vidmar and 
Valerie Hans explain, “[v]oir dire, a term with a French origin meaning roughly ‘to 
see them say,’ is used to denote the process whereby prospective jurors are 
questioned about their biases during the jury selection process . . . .”8 In federal 
court, voir dire is generally conducted by the trial judge.9 In state court, voir dire 
practice varies widely depending on the jurisdiction. In most states, voir dire is 
conducted by both the judge and the attorneys.10 
7. In the Ferguson case, since the grand jury convened by prosecutor Robert McCulloch
declined to indict Officer Wilson in November 2014, prosecutors did not need to answer this question. 
Taylor Wofford, After Grand Jury Decides Not to Charge Darren Wilson, What’s Next for Ferguson?, 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:35 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/no-charges-ferguson-michael-
brown-shooting-case-285976 [http://perma.cc/6TNQ-N4MT]. Many thought McCulloch should have 
let someone else handle the case because of McCulloch’s strong ties to law enforcement and the fact 
that his father was a police officer who was killed by a Black man when McCulloch was only twelve 
years old. See Pema Levy, Ferguson Prosecutor Robert P. McCulloch’s Long History of Siding with the Police, 
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:33 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/ferguson-prosecutor-robert-p-
mccullochs-long-history-siding-police-267357 [http://perma.cc/ZU9A-QP9S] (“[McCulloch’s] father 
was a St. Louis policeman killed in the line of duty by a Black man when McCulloch was 12. 
[McCulloch’s] brother, nephew and cousin all served with the St. Louis police [department]”); see also 
Leigh Ann Caldwell, Concerns Arise About Prosecutor in Michael Brown Case, CNN (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:48 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/us/ferguson-prosecutor-mcculloch [http://perma.cc/6PSH-
SEXY]. After it came to light that McCulloch knew some of the witnesses he presented to the grand 
jury were lying, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund asked a Missouri judge to reconvene a new grand jury 
panel to reconsider the case. Christopher Harress, NAACP Calls for New Ferguson Grand Jury Citing 
Multiple Concerns with November Decision, INT’L BUS. TIMES ( Jan. 6, 2015, 7:25 PM), http://
www.ibtimes.com/naacp-calls-new-ferguson-grand-jury-citing-multiple-concerns-november-decision-
1775386 [http://perma.cc/Z5RD-2G2E]. The judge denied the NAACP’s request to convene a new 
grand jury. Associated Press, Judge Rejects Request for New Ferguson Grand Jury, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/21/judge-rejects-request-for-new-ferguson-
grand-jury/. 
8. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 87 (2007).
9. Tamara F. Lawson, Before the Verdict and Beyond the Verdict: The CSI Infection Within Modern
Criminal Jury Trials, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 119, 145 (2009) (noting that in the federal system, judges ask 
most of the questions during voir dire, whereas in the state system, judges allow attorneys to ask most 
questions). 
10. Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive Peremptory 
Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 378–79 n.44 (2010) (citing Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, 
Avoiding Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1184 (2003)) (noting that in forty-three states, voir dire questioning is 
conducted by both the judge and attorneys); David B. Rottman et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
State Court Organization 1998, at 273–77 tbl.41 (2000), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
sco98.pdf [http://perma.cc/2SMK-7ETA] (listing four states—Connecticut, North Carolina, Texas, 
and Wyoming—in which attorneys only conduct voir dire, listing seven states—Arizona, California, 
Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey—in which judges only 
conduct voir dire, and noting that both attorneys and judges conduct voir dire in the remaining states). 
In Missouri, judges usually allow the attorneys to ask the questions during jury selection, but the judge 
may, at her discretion, conduct some or all of the voir dire herself. Your Missouri Courts, TRIAL JUDGES 
CRIMINAL BENCHBOOK §§ 7.8–.9 (Kelly Broniec et al. eds., 2007), http://www.courts.mo.gov/
hosted/resourcecenter/TJCB%20Published%20April%208.2011/TJBB.htm#CH_07_JurySelect_2d_
files/CH_07_JurySelect_2d.htm (noting that voir dire is done first by the counsel for the state and 
then by the counsel for the defendant (§ 7.8), but also noting that in some instances—at the court’s 
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It is important to note that racial bias is not unique to any particular group. 
While it is often assumed that racial bias means bias in favor of Whites and against 
Blacks, racial bias can cut in many different ways. In the Ferguson case, for example, 
those who believed Michael Brown was shot when he had his hands up before the 
Department of Justice’s investigation into the shooting was completed11 may have 
assumed Officer Wilson was lying when he claimed self-defense because of 
stereotypes about White police officers as racist individuals. At the same time, those 
who believed the officer’s account of what happened before knowing all of the facts 
relating to the shooting may have assumed Michael Brown was acting in a 
threatening way because of stereotypes about Black men. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of voir dire into racial bias in 
only a handful of cases. All of these cases dealt with the issue of whether a criminal 
defendant has the right to have prospective jurors questioned on racial bias, and the 
last time the Court dealt with this issue was in 1986, more than twenty-five years 
ago. 
Reasonable minds can disagree as to whether it is good trial strategy to voir 
dire prospective jurors on racial bias. Perhaps the most common view is that 
reflected by Albert Alschuler, who suggested over twenty-five years ago that voir 
dire into racial bias would be “minimally useful.”12 Alschuler argued that asking a 
prospective juror whether he would be prejudiced against the defendant because of 
the defendant’s race would be patronizing and offensive.13 He also argued that no 
prospective juror would admit to racial bias, even if he was in fact prejudiced against 
members of a particular racial group.14 
In this Article, I rely on empirical research on implicit bias to challenge 
Alschuler’s view that voir dire into racial bias would be of minimal benefit to an 
attorney concerned about such bias. This research suggests that for an attorney 
concerned that racial stereotypes about the defendant, the victim, or a witness might 
affect how the jury interprets the evidence, voir dire into racial bias can be extremely 
helpful. Calling attention to implicit racial bias can encourage jurors to view the 
evidence without the usual preconceptions and automatic associations involving 
race that most of us make. While I agree with Alschuler that a simple, close-ended 
question like, “Are you going to be biased against the defendant because of his 
race?” is unlikely to be helpful, I believe that a series of open-ended questions 
discretion—the judge can conduct some or all of the voir dire by herself (§ 7.9)); Michael L. Matula & 
G. Nicole Hininger, The Law of Jury Selection in Missouri State Courts, 66 J. Mo. BAR 136 (2010), https://
www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Journal/2010/05-06/The%20Law%20of%20
Jury%20Selection%20in%20Missouri%20State%20Courts.pdf (noting that all parties have the 
opportunity to question jurors to expose juror bias or prejudice). 
11. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 5–8 (2015) (finding that the physical and forensic 
evidence supported Officer Wilson’s claim of self-defense). 
12. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160 (1989). 
13. Id. at 161.
14. Id. at 160 (“One doubts that Lester Maddox, Orville Faubus, George Wallace, Theodore
Bilbo or anyone else would have responded to the proposed question by confessing a bias . . . .”). 
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educating jurors about implicit bias and encouraging them to reflect upon whether 
and how implicit racial bias might affect their ability to even-handedly consider the 
evidence can be beneficial in helping to ensure a truly impartial jury. 
My Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I provide an overview of the 
process of voir dire and review the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on voir dire into 
racial bias. In Part II, I examine social science research that helps answer the 
question whether it is a good idea to conduct voir dire into racial bias. Some of this 
research relates to the Implicit Association Test (IAT), an online test that measures 
implicit bias by comparing response times to selected words and images. 
Additionally, however, a wealth of less familiar empirical research on race salience 
conducted over the past decade indicates that calling attention to race can motivate 
jurors to treat Black and White defendants equally, whereas not highlighting race 
may result in jurors tending to be more punitive and less empathetic towards Black 
defendants than they might otherwise be without such attention. 
In Part III, I examine a few recent studies calling into question whether making 
race salient is a good idea. These studies indicate that when White individuals 
perceive extreme racial differences in the prison population (i.e., when they believe 
there are many more Blacks and Latinos than Whites in prison), they are more likely 
to support punitive criminal justice policies than when they perceive that the 
proportion of minorities in prison is not so large. I analyze these studies and 
conclude that, while they may appear at first glance to contradict the race salience 
research, they do not in fact undermine that research. 
In Part IV, I turn to the question of what steps can be taken to combat implicit 
racial bias in the criminal courtroom. I argue that in light of the social science 
research on implicit bias and race salience, it is best for an attorney concerned about 
racial bias to confront the issue of race head on during jury selection. Voir dire can 
be used to both educate prospective jurors about the concept of implicit bias and 
help them to become aware of their own implicit biases. It makes sense to address 
the possibility of implicit racial bias early on, rather than waiting until just before 
the jury deliberates, as it may be too late by then to undo its effects. 
I. VOIR DIRE 
It is often said that a trial is won or lost when the jury is selected.15 This is 
because “jurors bring to the courtroom biases and predispositions which largely 
determine the outcome of the case.”16 The process of voir dire presents an 
opportunity for the attorneys to influence who ends up sitting on the jury, at least 
in jurisdictions where attorney voir dire is permitted. 
In this Part, I first discuss the process of voir dire and its role in jury selection. 
15. Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society,
91 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1590 n.223 (2013). 
16. Margaret Covington, Jury Selection: Innovative Approaches to Both Civil and Criminal Litigation, 16 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 575, 576 (1985). 
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I also examine the benefits of attorney voir dire over judge-dominated voir dire. I 
then discuss the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on voir dire into racial bias. 
A. The Process of Voir Dire 
“Voir dire is the process of questioning prospective jurors about their 
qualifications to serve on the jury panel to decide the case.”17 In federal court, voir 
dire is usually conducted by the judge.18 In state court, jury selection procedures 
vary widely with judge-dominated voir dire the practice in seven states, attorney-
dominated voir dire the practice in four states, and a mix of judge and attorney 
questions in the remaining state courts.19 Some courts allow the attorneys to 
propose questions that are then given to prospective jurors in the form of a written 
questionnaire.20 
According to one source, jury selection in felony cases takes an average of 3.6 
to 3.8 hours.21 During the process of jury selection, the parties are given the 
opportunity to strike an unlimited number of prospective jurors for cause. A “for 
cause” challenge will be granted if the judge finds that the party has articulated a 
good reason that the juror should not serve, such as an inability to be impartial or a 
prior relationship with the defendant, the defense attorney, the prosecutor, the 
judge, or one of the witnesses.22 Each side is also given a set number of peremptory 
challenges,23 which can be used to strike a prospective juror for any reason or no 
reason at all, as long as the reason for striking the prospective juror is not based on 
the individual’s race or gender.24 
In order to guard against the possibility that attorneys may use their 
peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors based on their race, the Court in 
Batson v. Kentucky25 established a three-part framework much like the three-part 
framework used in the Title VII context to determine whether an individual has 
17. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of
Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
149, 158 (2010). 
18. Lawson, supra note 9, at 145.
19. Rottman et al., supra note 10, at 273–77.
20. Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gretchen Jensen, What, Me? Prejudiced? Absolutely Not!,
TRIAL, Dec. 2000, at 20, 22. 
21. Collin P. Wedel, Note, Twelve Angry (and Stereotyped) Jurors: How Courts Can Use Scientific Jury
Selection to End Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 293, 315 (2011). 
22. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 8, at 87 (“A ‘challenge for cause’ is an assertion by one of the
lawyers that a potential juror is not impartial.”). 
23. For example, in federal court, a defendant charged with a felony is given ten peremptory
challenges, and the prosecutor is given six peremptory challenges. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2). If the 
defendant is in federal court and charged with a misdemeanor, both the defendant and the prosecutor 
are given three peremptory challenges. (b)(3). In a federal capital case, both sides get twenty peremptory 
challenges. (b)(1).  
24. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (forbidding peremptory challenges based on gender); 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting peremptory challenges based on race). 
25. Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
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been denied a job on the basis of unlawful discrimination.26 Under the Batson 
framework, if one party believes the other party has used a peremptory strike to 
remove a juror because of the juror’s race, that party may assert a Batson challenge.27 
The challenger must first set forth a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.28 
Under the original Batson framework, a defendant who asserted a Batson challenge 
could establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of 
the jury by showing “that he [was] a member of a cognizable racial group . . . , and 
that the prosecutor [had] exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the 
venire members of the defendant’s race.”29 Once the defendant showed that these 
facts and any other relevant circumstances raised an inference that the opposing 
party used its peremptory challenges to exclude individuals from the jury on account 
of their race,30 the burden shifted to the opposing party to proffer a race-neutral 
reason for the strike.31 After a race-neutral reason was proffered by the party 
opposing the Batson challenge, the trial court had to decide whether the challenger 
has met its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.32 In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the 
Court extended Batson to forbid peremptory challenges based on gender.33 At least 
one lower court has gone further, applying Batson to peremptory challenges based 
on sexual orientation.34 
26. Under the three-part framework established by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
the employee must first establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by a preponderance of 
the evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The employee can establish 
a prima facie case by showing (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for a 
job the employer was trying to fill; (3) though qualified, he was rejected; and (4) thereafter the employer 
continued to seek applicants with complainant’s qualifications. Id. Once the employee establishes a 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut this prima facie case by articulating a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. Id. The employee can prevail only if 
he can show that the employer’s response is merely a pretext for behavior actually motivated by 
discrimination. Id. at 798. 
27. Because Batson involved a defendant’s challenge to a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge, its
holding left open the question whether a prosecutor could assert a challenge against a defendant if he 
believed the defendant was exercising its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. In 
1992, the Court answered this question in the affirmative, applying Batson to criminal defendants. 
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 46–48 (1992); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
614, 618–19 (1991) (extending Batson to civil litigants). 
28. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
29. Id. Subsequently, the Court broadened the Batson framework to include challenges based on 
ethnicity, see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), and later gender, see J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 
U.S. 127 (1994). 
30. Id.
31. Id. at 97. The Court, however, has made it fairly easy for the opposing party to rebut the
challenge, finding it is not necessary that the opposing party’s race-neutral explanation be minimally 
persuasive or even plausible at stage two of the Batson inquiry. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) 
(“The Court of Appeals erred by . . . requiring that the justification tendered at the second step be not 
just neutral but also at least minimally persuasive, i.e., a ‘plausible’ basis for believing that ‘the person’s 
ability to perform his or her duties as a juror’ will be affected.”). 
32. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
33. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
34. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2014).
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While Batson was well intended, it has not proven to be very effective.35 
Attorneys facing Batson challenges have been able to survive these challenges by 
proffering fairly implausible “race-neutral” reasons for their strikes. For example, in 
one case, a prosecutor who faced a Batson challenge from a Black defendant charged 
with importing heroin proffered two ostensibly race-neutral reasons for striking a 
Black woman from the jury.36 First, the prosecutor noted that the prospective juror 
was a postal employee and said that it was the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s general policy 
not to have postal employees on the jury.37 When pressed by the defense attorney, 
the prosecutor backed down and admitted that the office did not have such a policy 
and proffered a second reason for the strike.38 The prosecutor then suggested that 
because the prospective juror was a single parent who rented an apartment in an 
urban area, she “may be involved in a drug situation where she lives.”39 The judge 
accepted this second explanation as a race-neutral reason for the strike and denied 
the defense’s Batson objection.40 
In another case, the government used five of its six peremptory challenges to 
strike Black jurors.41 When the defendant, a Black man, asserted a Batson challenge, 
one of the race-neutral reasons proffered by the government for striking a Black 
female from the jury was that her name, Granderson, closely resembled that of a 
defendant, Anthony Grandison, in a previous case tried by the same prosecutor.42 
Even though that case was completely unrelated to the case at hand and therefore 
the fact that the prospective juror’s name was similar to the name of a defendant in 
a completely unrelated case would have had no bearing on the prospective juror’s 
ability to be fair and impartial, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that 
this was a neutral and nonpretextual reason for the strike and affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction.43 
In United States v. Romero-Reyna, the defendant, a Hispanic man charged with 
possession of marijuana and heroin with intent to distribute, challenged the 
government’s use of its peremptory challenges against six prospective jurors of 
Hispanic origin.44 The prosecutor proffered as a race-neutral reason for striking one 
of the individuals who worked as a pipeline operator that he had a “P” rule in which 
35. Professor Jean Montoya surveyed prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys and found
that most thought Batson was of limited effectiveness in eliminating racial discrimination in jury selection 
in large part because of the ease with which an attorney can come up with a race-neutral reason for the 
strike. Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the 
“Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1006 (1996). 
36. United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1993).
37. Id. at 390–91.
38. Id. at 391.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 1988).
42. Id. at 129.
43. Id.
44. United States v. Romero-Reyna, 889 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1989).
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he never accepted jurors whose occupations began with a “P.”45 The trial court 
accepted this explanation as nonpretextual and rejected the defendant’s Batson 
challenge.46 On remand, the prosecutor repeated adherence to his “P” rule, but 
added that he had been informed that marijuana use by pipeline operators was 
prevalent.47 This time, the trial court rejected the prosecutor’s “P” rule as a 
legitimate basis for the strike, noting that several other members of the venire had 
occupations beginning with the letter “P” and had not been struck by the 
prosecutor.48 Nonetheless, the trial court found that the newly added explanation 
was race-neutral and not a pretextual reason for the strike and rejected the 
defendant’s Batson challenge again.49 
Another problem is that the attorney exercising the challenged strike may not 
even be aware that she would not have struck the prospective juror if that individual 
had been of another race. As Antony Page explains, an attorney may be unaware 
that she has relied on racial stereotypes in forming her opinions about the 
prospective juror.50 When asked to provide a race-neutral reason for the strike, the 
attorney may sincerely believe that she struck the prospective juror for reasons not 
related to the juror’s race, even though implicit racial bias may have in fact 
influenced the attorney’s perceptions of the individual.51 “By the time the lawyer 
exercises the peremptory challenge, stereotypes may have thoroughly affected her 
observation and interpretation of the information upon which she makes her 
decision.”52 In light of these and other problems with the Batson framework, critics 
of Batson have argued that it would be best to simply eliminate the peremptory 
challenge altogether and force attorneys to take the first twelve individuals in the 
jury box unless the attorneys can articulate reasons to challenge those individuals 
for cause.53 
Regardless of whether peremptory challenges continue to exist in our criminal 
justice system, a critical question remains: which legal actor—the judge or the 
attorney—should conduct voir dire? Empirical research suggests that judge-
dominated voir dire is less effective at discovering juror bias than attorney voir dire 
because prospective jurors often give what they think is the socially desirable 
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 561.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Antony Page, Batson’s Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. 
L. REV. 155, 228 (2005). 
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
369, 420–23 (1992); Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise 
Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. REV. 361, 374 (1990); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (opining that the only way to stop the discriminatory use of the peremptory 
challenge is to completely abolish peremptory challenges). 
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response when the judge is asking the questions.54 There are other reasons why a 
trial court should allow the attorneys to conduct voir dire, particularly when the case 
involves the possibility of racial bias. As Judge Mark Bennett notes, attorneys usually 
know the case better than the trial judge, and therefore “are in the best position to 
determine how explicit and implicit biases among potential jurors might affect the 
outcome.”55 Attorneys also have more of an incentive than the trial judge to use 
jury consultants and other resources “to develop voir dire strategies to address both 
explicit and implicit biases of prospective jurors.”56 This is because attorneys need 
as much information as possible about the prospective jurors in order to know 
which prospective jurors would have difficulty being impartial and should be 
stricken from the jury.57 
B. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Voir Dire into Racial Bias 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether a criminal 
defendant has a right to question prospective jurors on the issue of racial bias in 
only a handful of cases. Not surprisingly, the Court has gone back and forth on this 
issue. 
Initially, the Court was sympathetic to the idea that a criminal defendant has a 
constitutional right to question prospective jurors about racial bias. In 1931, the 
Court reversed a Black defendant’s murder conviction where the trial judge had 
refused a defense request to interrogate the venire on racial prejudice.58 In Aldridge 
v. United States, a Black man charged with the murder of a White police officer was 
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.59 The trial judge had 
refused a defense request to question prospective jurors on whether they had any 
racial prejudice based on the fact that the defendant was Black and the deceased 
was White.60 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating that fairness 
demands that inquiries into racial prejudice be allowed.61 In response to the lower 
court’s suggestion that such inquiry was unnecessary since African Americans were 
afforded the same rights and privileges as Whites, such as the right to practice law 
and the right to serve on juries,62 the Court said, “Despite the privileges accorded 
to the negro, we do not think that it can be said that the possibility of such prejudice 
 
54. See Bennett, supra note 17, at 160; Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: 
An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 131, 143 (1987) (finding that 
prospective jurors respond more candidly and are less likely to give what they think is the socially 
desirable response when attorneys are asking the questions during voir dire than when the judge is 
asking questions). 
55. Bennett, supra note 17, at 160. 
56. Id. 
57. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[P]reventing 
bias . . . . lies at the very heart of the jury system.” (citations omitted)). 
58. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931). 
59. Id. at 309. 
60. Id. at 310–11. 
61. Id. at 313. 
62. Id. at 316 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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is so remote as to justify the risk in forbidding the inquiry.”63 Noting “[t]he 
argument is advanced on behalf of the government that it would be detrimental to 
the administration of the law in the courts of the United States to allow questions 
to jurors as to racial or religious prejudices,”64 the Aldridge Court concluded, “We 
think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons 
entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that 
inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred.”65 
The Court did not revisit the question of whether a criminal defendant has a 
right to require the trial judge to question prospective jurors on racial bias until 
1973, more than forty years later. In Ham v. South Carolina, a case involving a Black 
civil rights activist charged with possession of marijuana, the Court again sided with 
the defendant, holding that a trial judge’s refusal to question prospective jurors as 
to possible racial prejudice violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.66 This 
time, the Court went further than it had in Aldridge v. United States and expressly 
grounded its decision in due process, holding that “the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that . . . the [defendant] be permitted to have the 
jurors interrogated on the issue of racial bias.”67 The Ham Court reaffirmed the trial 
court’s discretion to conduct voir dire in the manner it thinks is best, noting that 
the trial judge is “not required to put the question in any particular form, or to ask 
any particular number of questions on the subject, simply because requested to do 
so by [the defendant].”68 It also limited the right in controversy to questioning 
regarding possible bias to racial bias, refusing to require the trial court to question 
prospective jurors regarding bias against persons with beards even though the 
defendant, who sported a beard, had requested such voir dire.69 
A mere three years later, the Court started backtracking from its support for 
voir dire into racial bias. In Ristaino v. Ross, the Court held that the mere fact that 
the defendant is Black and the victim is White is not enough to trigger the 
constitutional requirement that the trial court question prospective jurors about 
racial prejudice.70 The defendants in Ristaino v. Ross were three Black men on trial 
for armed robbery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault 
with intent to murder two White security guards.71 Defendant Ross requested that 
the trial judge ask prospective jurors the following question: “Are there any of you 
who believe that a White person is more likely to be telling the truth than a Black 
person?”72 The trial court not only refused to ask this particular question, it failed 
 
63. Id. at 314. 
64. Id. at 314–15. 
65. Id. at 315. 
66. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529 (1973). 
67. Id. at 527. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 527–28. 
70. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976). 
71. Id. at 590. 
72. Id. at 590 n.1. 
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to make any reference to race when giving jurors an overview of the facts of the 
case and when questioning the jurors about possible bias or prejudice for or against 
either of the defendants or the victim.73 The jury convicted the defendants on all 
counts.74 
In holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to question the venire on 
racial bias, the Court attempted to distinguish the case before it from Ham v. South 
Carolina. Somewhat unconvincingly, the Court explained that racial issues were 
“inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial” in Ham because Ham, who 
had a reputation as a civil rights activist, claimed that he had been framed because 
of his civil rights work.75 The Ristaino Court continued, “The mere fact that the 
victim of the crimes alleged was a White man and the defendants were Negroes was 
less likely to distort the trial than were the special factors involved in Ham.”76 The 
Court then established what some have called a “special circumstances” rule: a 
defendant has a constitutional right to have prospective jurors questioned on racial 
bias only if the circumstances of the case suggest a “significant likelihood” of 
prejudice by the jurors.77 
Even though the Ristaino Court refused to find a due process violation in the 
trial court’s failure to question jurors on racial bias, it did acknowledge the 
usefulness of asking questions on racial bias as a prudential matter. “Although we 
hold that voir dire questioning directed to racial prejudice was not constitutionally 
required, the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed 
to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant.”78 The Court indicated 
that had the case been tried in federal court, it would have used its supervisory 
power to require the trial court to ask prospective jurors questions on racial bias.79 
In 1981, the Court revisited the issue of voir dire into racial bias in a case 
involving a defendant of Mexican descent. The defendant in Rosales-Lopez v. United 
States was charged with smuggling undocumented Mexican immigrants into the 
United States.80 The defendant requested that prospective jurors be asked the 
following questions: “Would you consider the race or Mexican descent of 
Humberto Rosales-Lopez in your evaluation of this case? How would it affect 
 
73. Id. at 592 nn.3–4. 
74. Id. at 593. 
75. Id. at 596–97. 
76. Id. at 597. 
77. Id. at 596–97; see also Laura A. Giantris, The Necessity of Inquiry into Racial Bias in Voir Dire, The 
Maryland Survey: 1994-1995, 55 MD. L. REV. 615, 629 (1996). Giantris discusses Hill v. State, a Maryland 
decision in which the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s refusal to question the venire 
on racial or ethnic bias constituted constitutional error and concludes that “[a]s a result of Hill, Maryland 
criminal defendants no longer must meet the burdensome ‘special circumstances’ test as enunciated in 
Thornton and Rosales-Lopez.” Id.; see also Barry P. Goode, Religion, Politics, Race, and Ethnicity: The Range and 
Limits of Voir Dire, 92 KY. L.J. 601, 672 (2004) (“Ristaino established a ‘special circumstances’ rule: the 
Constitution only requires a court to allow defendants to ask questions designed to elicit racial prejudice 
when the special circumstances of a case indicate a significant likelihood of prejudice by the jurors.”). 
78. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597 n.9.  
79. Id. 
80. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981). 
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you?”81 The trial judge did not pose either of these questions to the prospective 
jurors, nor did he pose any questions specifically addressed to possible prejudice 
against the defendant because of his race or ethnicity.82 The trial judge instead asked 
the following questions of prospective jurors: “Do any of you have any feelings 
about the alien problem at all?”; and “Do any of you have any particular feelings 
one way or the other about aliens or could you sit as a fair and impartial juror if you 
are called upon to do so?”83 
In considering defendant Rosales-Lopez’s appeal, the Supreme Court started 
by discussing the importance of voir dire, noting that “[v]oir dire plays a critical 
function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury will be honored.”84 The Court observed that lack of adequate voir dire 
impairs the trial court’s ability to remove jurors who cannot act impartially.85 Next, 
the Court noted that “federal judges have been accorded ample discretion in 
determining how best to conduct the voir dire.”86 This is due to the fact that the 
responsibility to impanel an impartial jury lies with the trial judge.87 Additionally, 
the trial judge is able to see the prospective jurors and their responses, both verbal 
and nonverbal, to the questions posed to them during voir dire.88 
The Court next distinguished between questions directed at the discovery of 
racial prejudice that are constitutionally mandated and questions directed at the 
discovery of racial prejudice that are required of federal courts as a matter of the 
Court’s supervisory authority over the federal courts.89 The Court then established 
a new nonconstitutional rule for federal courts, holding that federal courts must 
inquire into racial prejudice “when requested by a defendant accused of a violent 
crime and where the defendant and the victim are members of different racial or 
ethnic groups.”90 In all other cases, the Court explained, reversible error will occur 
only when the circumstances of the case “indicate that there is a reasonable 
possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury.”91 Because 
Rosales-Lopez was charged with smuggling, not a crime of interracial violence, the 
trial court was not required to ask questions directed at racial prejudice even though 
requested to do so by the defense unless there was a reasonable possibility that racial 
 
81. Id. at 185. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 186. It could be argued that the trial court’s use of the word “alien” to describe Rosales-
Lopez encouraged the jurors to be biased against Rosales-Lopez. The word “alien,” which is used to 
refer to one who is an immigrant to the United States, conjures up images of aliens from outer space. 
Because of this, many progressives use the phrase “undocumented immigrant” rather than “illegal 
alien.” 
84. Id. at 188. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 189. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 190. 
90. Id. at 196. 
91. Id. at 191. In other words, in all other cases, the special circumstances rule established in 
Ristaino v. Ross would control. 
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or ethnic prejudice influenced the jury.92 The Court did not believe such a possibility 
existed in this case.93 
While Rosales-Lopez may not have been happy with the Supreme Court’s 
decision since the Court affirmed his conviction, the decision was partially good 
news for future defendants, as it established a new defense-friendly rule—albeit one 
that leaves discretion in the trial court’s hands—for defendants seeking voir dire 
into racial bias in federal courts. In federal cases involving a defendant and a victim 
of different races or ethnicities and a crime of violence, the trial court should as a 
prudential matter conduct voir dire into racial prejudice if the defense requests that 
it do so.94 
In 1986, the Court addressed the issue of a defendant’s right to have 
prospective jurors questioned on racial prejudice for the last time to date.95 In Turner 
v. Murray, Willie Lloyd Turner, a Black man, was charged with capital murder and 
other crimes after fatally shooting a White jewelry store owner with a sawed off 
shotgun in front of a police officer and three witnesses.96 Apparently, Turner 
became upset with the store owner after learning that he had triggered a silent alarm 
to summon the police to the store.97 
Prior to jury selection, Turner’s attorney submitted to the trial judge a list of 
questions that he wished to ask the venire, including the following question: “The 
defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro race. The victim, W. Jack 
Smith, Jr., was a White Caucasian. Will these facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd 
Turner or affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on 
the evidence?”98 The trial court refused to ask this question, instead asking the 
venire the more generic question “whether any person was aware of any reason why 
he could not render a fair and impartial verdict.”99 Everyone on the venire 
responded to this question in the negative.100 At the time they were asked this 
question, the prospective jurors did not know that the victim was White.101 Eight 
 
92. Id. at 192. 
93. Id. at 193. 
94. Id. at 192. 
95. The Court has mentioned voir dire on racial bias in other cases, but this was not the main 
issue in those cases. See, e.g., Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014). The court held that a 
plaintiff in a personal injury suit may not use a juror affidavit detailing alleged juror dishonesty to get a 
new trial while noting in a footnote, “There may be cases of juror bias so extreme that, almost by 
definition, the jury trial right has been abridged. . . . We need not consider the question, however, for 
those facts are not presented here.” Id.; see also, e.g., Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422–24 (1991) 
(finding no error in trial court’s refusal to further question prospective jurors about news reports to 
which they had been exposed while discussing cases involving voir dire into racial bias as examples of 
state cases on the extent of voir dire examination). 
96. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 29–30 (1986). 
97. Id. at 30. 
98. Id. at 30–31. 
99. Id. at 31. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
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Whites and four Blacks were selected to serve on the jury.102 The jury found the 
defendant guilty of all charges, and after a separate sentencing hearing, 
recommended that Turner be sentenced to death.103 
Turner appealed his death sentence, which the Supreme Court reversed.104 
The Court started by reaffirming what it stated in Ristaino: the mere fact that the 
defendant is Black and the victim is White is not a special circumstance of 
constitutional significance.105 The Court then distinguished this case from Ristaino, 
noting that in addition to the fact that Turner was Black and his victim was White, 
Turner was charged with a capital offense.106 The Court explained why this one fact 
mattered so much. The jury in a capital case, the Court explained, has an enormous 
amount of discretion.107 First, the capital jury must decide whether aggravating 
factors merit putting the defendant to death. The jury must decide, for example, 
whether the defendant is likely to commit future violent acts, or whether his crime 
was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, 
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim.”108 Additionally, “the 
[capital] jury must consider any mitigating evidence offered by the defendant.”109 
Next, the Court exhibited an amazing amount of prescience in its recognition 
of the concept of implicit racial bias. Even though Turner was decided in 1986, 
almost thirty years ago, the Court at that time realized the “unique opportunity for 
racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected”:110 
[A] juror who believes that Blacks are violence prone or morally inferior 
might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether petitioner’s 
crime involved the aggravating factors specified under Virginia law. Such 
a juror might also be less favorably inclined toward petitioner’s evidence 
of mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More subtle, less 
consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror’s decision in 
this case. Fear of Blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent 
facts of petitioner’s crime, might incline a juror to favor the death 
penalty.111 
The Turner Court noted that in cases like the one before it where the defendant was 
charged with a crime of violence and the defendant and victim were of different 
races, there was a real risk that racial prejudice might infect the proceeding and 
improperly lead to a death sentence.112 “The risk of racial prejudice infecting a 
capital sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 31–33. 
105. Id. at 33. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 33–34. 
108. Id. at 34. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 35. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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of the death sentence.”113 The Court found the risk that racial prejudice may have 
infected Turner’s capital sentencing “unacceptable in light of the ease with which 
that risk could have been minimized.”114 In the Court’s view, the trial judge could 
have minimized this risk by questioning prospective jurors on racial prejudice but 
refused to do so.115 The Court concluded by holding that “a capital defendant 
accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the 
race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.”116 The Court made 
clear that “the trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions 
on the subject.”117 Moreover, “a defendant cannot complain of a judge’s failure to 
question the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has specifically 
requested such an inquiry.”118 
Turner thus established a constitutional right to voir dire into racial bias in all 
capital cases in which the defendant is charged with an interracial crime of violence, 
as long as the defendant specifically requests such voir dire.119 Oddly, however, the 
Court limited its holding by reversing only the death sentence Turner received, not 
his guilty conviction.120 Even though the twelve jurors who voted to have Turner 
executed were the same jurors who found him guilty, the Court refused to vacate 
Turner’s conviction. The Court explained: 
At the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the jury had no greater discretion 
than it would have had if the crime charged had been noncapital murder. 
Thus, with respect to the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, we find this case 
to be indistinguishable from Ristaino, to which we continue to adhere.121 
The problem with this reasoning is that Ristaino is distinguishable from Turner. 
Ristaino was never at risk of being put to death, but Turner was. If Turner’s jury 
had not convicted him in the first place, he would not have been at risk of being 
executed. Moreover, if a juror’s racial beliefs might influence her to see the 
defendant as more violent and dangerous, and lead that juror to more readily accept 
evidence of aggravating factors and discount evidence of mitigating factors, then 
those same beliefs are likely to color the juror’s weighing of the evidence presented 
at the guilt phase of the trial.122 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on voir dire into racial bias leaves us with 
the following general rules. A capital defendant charged with an interracial crime of 
 
113. Id. at 36. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 36–37. 
117. Id. at 37. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 36–37. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 37–38. 
122. As noted by Justice Clark in Gideon v. Wainwright : “How can the Fourteenth Amendment 
tolerate a procedure which it condemns in capital cases on the ground that deprival of liberty may be 
less onerous than deprival of life—a value judgment not universally accepted . . . ?” Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring). 
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violence in either state or federal court has a due process right to have prospective 
jurors questioned on racial bias, but the defendant must specifically request such 
voir dire in order to trigger the constitutional right.123 A noncapital defendant has a 
constitutional right to have prospective jurors questioned on racial bias only if the 
circumstances of the case suggest a significant likelihood of prejudice by the 
jurors.124 The mere fact that the defendant and victim are of different races is not 
considered a special circumstance triggering the due process right to voir dire into 
racial bias.125 A federal court overseeing a case involving a defendant charged with 
an interracial crime of violence should, as a prudential matter, allow the defense to 
question prospective jurors on racial bias as long as the defendant requests such 
voir dire.126 The States of course are free to go further than the constitutional 
minimums set forth by the Supreme Court. 
All of the Supreme Court cases on voir dire into racial bias to date have 
focused on whether the defendant has a right to such voir dire. The Court has never 
addressed the question of whether the government has a corresponding right to 
have prospective jurors questioned on racial bias. In certain cases, particularly in 
interracial cases involving a White defendant and a Black victim, the prosecutor may 
be concerned that racial stereotypes may lead jurors to sympathize with the 
defendant and have less empathy for the victim. Racial stereotypes about Black men 
as dangerous, violent criminals may encourage jurors to see the victim’s actions as 
threatening and the defendant’s actions as reasonable. 
In perhaps the only law review article to focus on this question, Tania Tetlow 
argues that the Supreme Court should establish that the prosecutor shares the 
defendant’s constitutional right to conduct voir dire into racial bias.127 Tetlow notes 
that prosecutors are charged with “doing justice,” and argues that “doing justice” 
includes ensuring equal protection of the law for defendants and victims alike.128 
One way to ensure equal protection for victims of color, Tetlow argues, is to allow 
prosecutors to question prospective jurors on racial bias so they can better ascertain 
which individuals can serve as truly impartial jurors.129 Tetlow argues that the right 
to voir dire into racial bias should not be limited to capital cases in which the 
defendant is charged with an interracial crime of violence and cases involving a 
significant likelihood of prejudice in the jurors.130 Although it is difficult to make a 
case for a constitutional right to voir dire into racial bias for prosecutors, I agree 
that as a prudential matter, courts should permit prosecutors as well as defense 
 
123. Turner, 476 U.S. at 36–37. 
124. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1976). 
125. Id. 
126. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 192 (1981). 
127. Tania Tetlow, Granting Prosecutors Constitutional Rights to Combat Discrimination, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1117 (2012). 
128. Id. at 1125–26 (“Doing battle against discriminatory acquittal falls squarely within a 
prosecutor’s ethical duty to ‘do justice’ . . . .”). 
129. Id. at 1148–51. 
130. Id. at 1151–52. 
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attorneys to conduct voir dire into racial bias in any case in which racial stereotypes 
may influence the jury. 
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACE SALIENCE 
A. Implicit Bias 
Over the past decade, social scientists have convincingly demonstrated that 
bias is largely unconscious and often at odds with conscious beliefs.131 Even though 
one may sincerely believe that all individuals should be treated equally regardless of 
race, one may nonetheless have an implicit preference for individuals of one race 
over individuals of another race. This type of bias that exists outside of conscious 
awareness is called “implicit bias.” 
Social scientists have demonstrated that most Americans are affected by 
implicit bias through an online test known as the Implicit Association Test (IAT). 
The IAT measures the amount of time that an individual takes to associate different 
words and images viewed on a computer screen.132 When individuals are asked to 
pair words and images and those pairings are consistent with widely held beliefs and 
attitudes, their response times are fairly quick.133 When they are asked to pair words 
and images that do not correlate to widely held associations, response times are 
noticeably slower.134 For example, individuals asked to pair names like Katie and 
Meredith with words or images reflecting pleasant and nice things and names like 
Ebony and LaTonya, names associated with African Americans, with words or 
images reflecting unpleasant or negative things were able to do this task fairly 
quickly. 135 When they were asked to pair White-sounding names with unpleasant or 
negative words and images and African American sounding names with pleasant or 
positive words and images, their response times were noticeably slower.136 Since I 
have written at length about implicit bias in previous works, I will not repeat that 
discussion here.137 
Over fourteen million IATs, measuring bias based on age, gender, sexuality, 
among other types of biases, have been taken.138 IAT research has shown that both 
young and old individuals tend to favor the young and disfavor the elderly.139 Most 
 
131. Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and 
Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 856 (2001). 
132. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1509–10 (2005). 
133. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1130 (2012). 
134. Id. 
135. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit 
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1465–68 (1998). 
136. Id. at 1469–70. 
137. See Lee, supra note 15, at 1570–72 (2013); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 471, 536–49 (2008). 
138. MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF 
GOOD PEOPLE 69 (2013). 
139. Becca R. Levy & Mahzrin R. Banaji, Implicit Ageism, in AGEISM: STEREOTYPING AND 
PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 49, 55 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2002). Indeed, researchers have 
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heterosexuals taking the sexual orientation IAT have demonstrated an implicit bias 
in favor of heterosexuals over gays and lesbians.140 Of those who have taken the 
race IAT, seventy-five percent have demonstrated implicit bias in favor of Whites 
over Blacks.141 
B. Race Salience 
In light of the research on implicit bias, social scientists have studied whether 
race salience can encourage individuals to overcome their implicit racial biases. 
“Race salience” is a term of art used by some social scientists to refer to the process 
of making salient the potential for racial bias.142 “Race salience” does not simply 
refer to juror awareness of the races of the defendant and victim.143 It involves 
“‘making salient’ the potential racism of jurors’ attitudes.”144 
A wealth of fairly recent empirical research has shown that when race is made 
salient either through pretrial publicity, voir dire questioning of prospective jurors, 
opening and closing arguments, or witness testimony, White jurors are more likely 
to treat similarly situated Black and White defendants the same way.145 For example, 
in one study, Steven Fein and others examined the effects of pretrial publicity on 
mock jurors.146 The study found that most mock jurors were negatively influenced 
by newspaper articles that presented the facts in a way that disfavored the defendant, 
even when the mock jurors were told that the newspaper articles were inadmissible 
and should not be considered in deciding the defendant’s guilt.147 However, when 
mock jurors were given information suggesting that the media’s treatment of the 
defendant was racially biased, the negative bias against the defendant that the mock 
jurors had previously exhibited disappeared.148 
In another experiment conducted by Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth, 
jury-eligible citizens and actual jury pool members from a county in Michigan were 
 
found that implicit ageism or implicit bias against the elderly is even more prevalent than implicit racial 
bias against Blacks. Id. at 54–55. 
140. Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. 
REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 19 (2007) (finding that sixty-eight percent of study participants showed an 
implicit preference for straight people over gay people). 
141. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 138, at 47. 
142. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making: 
Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599, 601 (2009). 
143. Id. at 603–05. 
144. Id. at 601. 
145. Id. 
146. Steven Fein et al., Hype and Suspicion: The Effects of Pretrial Publicity, Race, and Suspicion on Jurors’ 
Verdicts, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES 487 (1997). 
147. Id. at 497 (“Exposure to pretrial publicity that reported incriminating information about 
the defendant made our mock jurors more likely to reach guilty verdicts than the mock jurors in the 
control condition.”). 
148. Id. (“The notable exception concerns mock jurors who received the incriminating pretrial 
publicity along with other publicity designed to make them suspect that the incriminating information 
may have been released to the public because of racist motives.”). 
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shown a videotaped summary of an actual rape trial involving a Black defendant.149 
Participants completed a voir dire questionnaire, watched a trial video, received 
actual State of Michigan pattern jury instructions, and deliberated on the case as 
members of six-person juries.150 Although all the mock jurors viewed the same trial 
video, some received questions about their racial attitudes and general perceptions 
of racial bias in the legal system on their voir dire questionnaire while other mock 
jurors did not.151 For example, some mock jurors read the following race-relevant 
question: “The defendant in the case is African-American and the victims are White. 
How might this affect your perceptions of the trial?”152 Another race-relevant 
question was: “In your opinion, how does the race of a defendant influence the 
treatment s/he receives in the legal system as a whole?”153 
Sommers and Ellsworth found that regardless of their race, mock jurors who 
received the race-relevant voir dire questions were less likely to vote to convict the 
Black defendant than the mock jurors who did not receive race-relevant voir dire 
questions.154 It is worth noting that the race relevant questions were not intended 
to identify jurors likely to exhibit racial bias in their judgments.155 Rather, they were 
“designed to force mock jurors to think about their racial attitudes and, more 
generally, about social norms against racial prejudice and institutional bias in the 
legal system.”156 
Calling attention to the possibility of racial bias through witness testimony can 
also help minimize racial bias. In another study, Ellen Cohn and others found that 
White mock jurors were less likely to convict a Black defendant charged with 
attempted vehicular manslaughter after striking three White men with his car if 
presented with testimony from the defendant’s wife revealing that the White victims 
shouted racial slurs at the defendant and his wife before the defendant got into his 
vehicle and sped away.157 Calling attention to the possibility that the victims may 
have been racially biased against the defendant may have encouraged the jurors to 
consider the facts with a bit more empathy for the defendant than they otherwise 
might have had. 
Racial bias can also be reduced if race is made salient by attorneys in their 
opening and closing statements. Donald Bucolo and Ellen Cohn found that when 
a defense attorney called attention to the possibility of racial bias in his opening and 
closing statements, White mock jurors were less likely to find the Black male 
 
149. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and 
Juries?: A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1026 (2003). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 1027. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Ellen S. Cohn et al., Reducing White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and Racial Attitudes, 39 
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1953, 1959, 1964 (2009). 
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defendant guilty of assault and battery than when the attorney did not call attention 
to the possibility of racial bias in his opening and closing statements.158 Statements 
making race salient included, “The defendant did what any (Black/White) man in 
this situation would do,” and “The only reason the defendant, and not the supposed 
victim, is being charged with this crime is because the defendant is (Black/White) 
and the victim is (White/Black).”159 Bucolo and Cohn concluded that highlighting 
race in an interracial trial was a beneficial defense strategy when the defendant was 
Black, “leading to decreased ratings of guilt.”160 
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND 
SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES 
Some recent social science research on racial perceptions of crime and support 
for punitive polices calls into question whether making race salient is a good idea. 
In 2014, Rebecca Hetey and Jennifer Eberhardt published the results of experiments 
they conducted in San Francisco and New York City.161 In each experiment, they 
manipulated the racial composition of the prison population and then measured the 
subject’s support for or acceptance of a punitive criminal justice policy.162 They 
found that when the prison population was represented as more Black, participants 
were more supportive of punitive criminal justice policies.163 
In the first experiment, Hetey and Eberhardt tested support for California’s 
Three Strikes Law.164 This law, passed in 1994, mandated a twenty-five-years-to-life 
prison sentence for anyone convicted of a felony after having been convicted of 
two prior violent or serious felonies.165 Even a minor third felony such as “stealing 
a dollar in loose change from a parked car” could result in a life sentence under the 
Three Strikes Law as originally enacted.166 In 2012, critics of the Three Strikes Law 
sought to amend it by permitting a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence only if the 
defendant’s third felony was a serious or violent felony.167 The proposed 
amendment would appear on the November 2012 ballot only if enough signatures 
supporting the amendment were gathered.168 
In the experiment, a White female recruited registered California voters from 
 
158. Donald O. Bucolo & Ellen S. Cohn, Playing the Race Card: Making Race Salient in Defence 
Opening and Closing Statements, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 293, 297, 299 (2010). 
159. Id. at 297. 
160. Id. at 299. 
161. Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase Acceptance 
of Punitive Policies, PSYCHOL. SCI. 1–6 (2014). 
162. Id. at 1. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 2. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. The ballot initiative, California Proposition 36, did appear on the November 2012 ballot 
and passed. STANFORD JUSTICE ADVOCACY PROJECT, https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-justice-
advocacy-project/ [https://perma.cc/F9CE-Y8NZ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2015). 
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a San Francisco Bay Area commuter station to participate in the study, which was 
described to them as exploring Californians’ views on social issues.169 Participants, 
all of whom were Caucasian, were shown eighty color photographs of Black and 
White inmates on an iPad.170 Some participants were shown fewer Black faces than 
other participants.171 In the “less Black” condition, only twenty-five percent of the 
photographs were of Black inmates, which was about the same percentage of Blacks 
actually in California prisons.172 In the “more Black” condition, forty-five percent 
of the photographs were of Black inmates, reflecting the approximate percentage 
of Blacks incarcerated under California’s Three Strikes Law.173 Next, the subjects 
were informed of California’s Three Strikes Law and the initiative to amend it.174 
Subjects were asked to rate how punitive they thought the Three Strikes Law was.175 
The subjects were then told the study was over and that the experimenter had copies 
of the actual petition, which they could look at and sign if they wanted.176 Subjects 
were told that if they signed the petition, their signature would be forwarded to the 
State Attorney General’s office to be counted.177 
Hetey and Eberhardt found that regardless of the condition they were in 
(“more Black” or “less Black”), subjects across the board agreed that California’s 
Three Strikes Law was too punitive rather than not punitive enough.178 Subjects in 
the “less Black” condition, however, were much more willing to sign the petition to 
amend the law to require that the third felony conviction be a serious or violent 
felony than subjects in the “more Black” condition.179 Of the participants who saw 
fewer photos of Black inmates, 51.72% signed the petition, whereas only 27.27% of 
participants who saw more photos of Black inmates signed the petition.180 Hetey 
and Eberhardt concluded that the Blacker the participant believed the prison 
population to be, the less willing the participant was to amend a law they 
acknowledged was overly punitive.181 
Hetey and Eberhardt conducted a second study (Study 2) in New York City, 
this time testing support for New York City’s controversial stop-and-frisk policy.182 
The researchers recruited White New York City residents to complete an online 
survey in October 2013.183 Instead of showing participants photos of inmates, they 
 
169. Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 161, at 2. 
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simply presented participants with statistics about the prison population.184 In the 
“less Black” condition, they told subjects that the prison population was 40.3% 
Black and 31.8% White, which was almost the actual percentage of Blacks in prisons 
across the nation.185 In the “more Black” condition, they told subjects that the 
prison population was 60.3% Black and 11.8% White, approximately the actual 
percentage of Black inmates in New York City Department of Corrections 
facilities.186 Next, participants were told that a federal judge had ruled that New 
York’s stop-and-frisk policy was unconstitutional (this was actually true) and that 
the city was appealing the judge’s ruling.187 Participants were then asked a series of 
questions designed to measure their support for keeping New York’s stop-and-frisk 
policy.188 Finally, participants were asked whether they would sign a petition to end 
New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy.189 
Hetey and Eberhardt found that regardless of what condition they were in, 
participants across the board felt that New York’s stop and frisk policy was 
“somewhat punitive.”190 Participants in the “more Black” condition, however, were 
“significantly less willing to sign a petition to end the stop-and-frisk policy than 
were participants in the less-Black condition.”191 Only 12.05% of participants in the 
“more Black” condition said they would sign the petition compared to 33.3% in the 
“less Black” condition.192 
Also in 2014, The Sentencing Project published a report entitled, Race and 
Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and Support for Punitive Policies.193 The Sentencing 
Project found that skewed racial perceptions of crime by White Americans bolster 
their support for harsh criminal justice policies.194 Synthesizing two decades of 
research,195 The Sentencing Project reported that White Americans consistently 
overestimate the proportion of crime committed by persons of color.196 The report 
theorized that attributing crime to racial minorities limits White Americans’ ability 
to empathize with offenders and encourages retribution as the primary response to 
crime.197 The result: increased support for punitive criminal justice policies. 
One might conclude that this recent research on racial perceptions of crime 
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193. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL 
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES (2014), http://
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_Race_and_Punishment.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4HH-
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195. Id. at 3. 
196. Id. at 5, 13. 
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leading to increased support for punitive policies means that calling attention to race 
is a bad idea as it may simply remind jurors of the association between Black and 
crime and encourage White jurors to act more punitively towards Black defendants. 
The research, however, does not support such a conclusion. Recall that The 
Sentencing Project’s report identified skewed or inaccurate racial perceptions of 
crime as the problem.198 Similarly, Hetey and Eberhardt’s Three Strikes study 
suggested that when individuals believed there were more Blacks in prison than 
might actually be the case, they were more supportive of punitive criminal justice 
policies.199 Indeed, the Sentencing Project explicitly supports making race salient, 
noting that “[m]ock jury studies have shown that increasing the salience of race in 
cases reduces bias in outcomes by making jurors more conscious of and thoughtful 
about their biases.”200 Making race and the possibility of racial bias salient, as 
opposed to highlighting extreme racial disparities in the prison population, can help 
reduce bias in jurors by encouraging them to think about and counter their own 
biases. 
Implicit racial bias—unconscious racial bias even among people who explicitly 
disavow racial prejudice—contributes to inaccurate perceptions of race and crime 
because it encourages individuals to associate all or most Blacks and Latinos with 
crime when only some Blacks and Latinos are engaging in criminal behavior.201 One 
way to overcome implicit racial bias is to recognize its existence. “Dispelling the 
illusion that we are colorblind in our decision making is a crucial first step to 
mitigating the impact of implicit racial bias.”202 
IV. COMBATING IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 
In light of the social science research on implicit bias, what steps can be taken 
to combat implicit racial bias in the criminal courtroom? This Section discusses a 
few different ways to address the problem of implicit bias in the courtroom. While 
the focus of this Article is on combating racial bias, the proposals discussed within 
can be helpful to attorneys concerned about bias of any kind.203 
A. Raising Awareness of Implicit Bias Through Jury Orientation Materials 
As Carol Izumi notes, “Awareness of bias is critical for mental 
decontamination success.”204 If so, then making sure jurors know what implicit bias 
 
198. Id. at 3, 5. 
199. Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 161, at 2. 
200. GHANDNOOSH, supra note 193, at 39. 
201. Id. at 14. 
202. Id. at 39. 
203. For an excellent discussion on the difficulties of conducting voir dire when the concern is 
bias against gays, lesbians, and other sexual minorities, see Giovanna Shay, In the Box: Voir Dire on LGBT 
Issues in Changing Times, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 407 (2014). 
204. Carol Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 
141 (2010) (citing Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice 
and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856 (2001)). 
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is and that they are likely to be affected by it is critical. Anna Roberts suggests one 
way to make jurors aware of the concept of implicit bias: include discussion of 
implicit bias in juror orientation materials. Roberts argues that including 
information about implicit bias in jury orientation materials, particularly jury 
orientation videos, makes sense for several reasons.205 First, information on implicit 
bias dovetails nicely with appeals to neutrality and egalitarian norms that are usually 
imparted to jurors during jury orientation.206 Second, “impressions formed early on 
can shape the understanding of what follows.”207 If a juror is made aware of implicit 
bias early on, she can better guard against it influencing her own decision making. 
Third, addressing implicit bias during jury orientation insures that all prospective 
jurors are educated about it, not just those who serendipitously end up with a judge 
who believes it important to mention the topic.208 Roberts goes further, suggesting 
not only that prospective jurors be informed about implicit bias during jury 
orientation but also that they should also be encouraged to take the IAT so they can 
experience bias within themselves.209 Although there is some research that suggests 
being forced to take diversity training leads to backlash and resistance,210 this 
research does not undermine Roberts’ proposal because Roberts does not suggest 
that courts require all prospective jurors to take the IAT. She would merely have 
courts encourage prospective jurors to take the IAT on a voluntary basis.211 
B. Raising Awareness of Implicit Bias Through Voir Dire 
Voir dire on the topic of racial bias offers another way to make jurors aware 
of the concept of implicit bias. As discussed above, a wealth of social science 
research suggests that making race salient or calling attention to the possibility of 
racial bias can encourage prospective jurors to reflect on their own possible biases 
and consciously counter what would otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent 
responses. Voir dire offers an opportunity to make race salient to prospective jurors. 
Questions designed to explore the subject of racial bias through voir dire 
would have to be carefully formatted. Open-ended questions that encourage 
reflection and thought about the powerful influence of race would be better than 
close-ended questions that simply encourage the prospective juror to give the 
politically correct response.212 Open-ended questions in general offer prospective 
 
205. Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. 
REV. 827, 863–65 (2012). 
206. Id. at 863. 
207. Id. at 864. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 867–71. 
210. See Rudman et al., supra note 204, at 857 (noting that involuntary diversity training has not 
been effective), 861 (noting that students who voluntarily enrolled in a diversity education seminar 
showed less implicit and explicit anti-Black bias at the end of the semester compared to students who 
did not take the class). 
211. Roberts, supra note 205, at 874 (“The IAT would be optional . . . .”). 
212. Regina A. Schuller et al., The Impact of Prejudice Screening Procedures on Racial Bias in the 
Courtroom, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 320, 326 (2009). 
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jurors the chance to reflect and comment. Open-ended questions on racial bias in 
particular can give the attorney much more valuable information about which 
prospective jurors are likely to try to overcome their implicit biases than close-ended 
questions in which the juror is prompted to give a short “yes” or “no” response.213 
Jonathan Rapping, President and founder of Gideon’s Promise,214 offers 
several examples of effective voir dire strategies for an attorney concerned about 
racial bias.215 Rapping suggests that an attorney could start with the following: 
You have just learned about the concept of [implicit racial bias]. Not 
everyone agrees on the power of its influence or that they are personally 
susceptible to it. I’d like to get a sense of your reaction to the concept of 
subconscious racial bias and whether you are open to believing it may 
influence you in your day-to-day decision-making. Let me start by asking 
for your reaction to learning about the idea of implicit, or subconscious, 
racial bias.216 
If a prospective juror expresses skepticism about implicit racial bias, Rapping 
recommends that the attorney respond as follows: “‘I appreciate your candor and 
thank you for sharing this view . . . it is certainly not an uncommon reaction to first 
learning about [implicit racial bias] . . . [D]o others share Juror Number X’s 
skepticism?’”217 
The attorney concerned about implicit racial bias will also want to find out 
which prospective jurors are motivated to act in egalitarian ways since social science 
research suggests that egalitarian-minded individuals are more likely than 
hierarchical individuals to try to counteract stereotypical thinking when made aware 
of the possibility of racial bias.218 To find out which individuals are motivated to act 
in egalitarian ways, Rapping cautions attorneys not to ask questions like “How do 
you feel about racism?” or “Do you believe it is ever appropriate to judge someone 
based on their skin color?” because prospective jurors may answer such questions 
by simply giving what they believe to be the socially desirable response.219 Rapping 
suggests that the attorney instead ask prospective jurors to “[d]escribe [their] most 
significant interaction(s) with a member of another race” or “[d]escribe a 
particularly impactful interaction that [they or someone close to them] had with a 
member of another race.”220 Such questions force the prospective jurors to think 
 
213. Id. at 326. 
214. Founded by Jonathan Rapping, Gideon’s Promise is a nonprofit organization that 
provides comprehensive advocacy training and community building support for both entry-level and 
seasoned public defenders. See FAQs, GIDEON’S PROMISE, http://gideonspromise.org/faqs/ 
[http://perma.cc/K9Z5-7FP5] (last visited Sept. 16, 2015). 
215. Jonathan A. Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders Can Affect Systemic Racist Assumptions, 
16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB POL’Y 999, 1032 (2013). 
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217. Id. at 1033. 
218. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 14–15 (1989). 
219. Rapping, supra note 215, at 1034. 
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about how they felt or acted in an actual situation as opposed to discussing how 
they think they would act in a hypothetical situation.221 This is important because 
“people often aspire to act in ways that do not perfectly match how they have 
behaved in the past.”222 As Rapping notes, “The best predictor of what a person 
will do in the future is not what they say they will do, but what they have done in 
the past in analogous situations.”223 An attorney might also ask a prospective juror 
to discuss “the best . . . experience the [prospective] juror has had with a member 
of another race” or ask the prospective juror to identify a member of another race 
whom the prospective juror admires.224 Such questions track the social science 
research on debiasing. This research indicates that encouraging people to think 
about admired African American figures, such as Barack Obama, Colin Powell, and 
Martin Luther King, and disfavored White individuals, such as Jeffrey Dahmer (the 
infamous serial killer also known as the Milwaukee Cannibal), Ted Kaczynski (the 
Unabomber), and Timothy McVeigh (the man responsible for the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing), can help jurors counter the impulse to associate Blacks with 
criminality.225 
C. Possible Objections 
My proposal that attorneys concerned about implicit racial bias use voir dire 
to counter the automatic stereotype-congruent associations that most individuals 
make based on race is likely to encounter resistance on a number of fronts. One 
possible objection echoes the concerns raised by Albert Alschuler several decades 
ago. Alschuler opined that voir dire into racial bias would be “minimally useful”226 
because any prospective juror asked whether he would be prejudiced against the 
defendant because of the defendant’s race would find such a question patronizing 
 
221. Id. Such questions could also force prospective jurors to think about whether they have 
ever had a significant interaction with a member of another race, which could also have a positive 
effect. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. (quoting Ira Mickenberg, Voir Dire and Jury Selection, NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER 
TRIAL SCHOOL 6 (2011), http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/2011DefenderTrialSchool/
VoirDire.pdf). 
224. Id. at 1035. Rapping suggests that the attorney should also ask the prospective juror to 
discuss negative experiences with members of another race and times that the juror relied on a 
stereotype that turned out to be wrong. Id. Reminding prospective jurors of negative experiences with 
members of another race, however, may trigger negative stereotypes, so I would focus on encouraging 
jurors to think about positive experiences with members of other racial groups and admired individuals 
belonging to the racial group in question. 
225. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: 
Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 800, 803–05 (2001) (finding that exposure to famous admired Black individuals and 
infamous disfavored White individuals lead to a reduction in automatic pro-White preferences); Jennifer 
A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial Evaluations, 41 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 137 (2010) (finding that exposure to admired Blacks and disliked Whites resulted in a weaker 
automatic preference for Whites, but exposure to admired Blacks and admired Whites did not reduce 
automatic preference for Whites). 
226. Alschuler, supra note 12. 
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and offensive.227 Alschuler suggested such voir dire would be akin to saying, 
“Pardon me. Are you a bigot?”228 
Alschuler’s objection, however, is not responsive to my proposal since I do 
not encourage attorneys to ask prospective jurors whether they will be prejudiced 
against the defendant on account of his race. I agree with Alschuler that a question 
like, “Are you likely to be biased against the defendant because of his race?” is 
unlikely to provoke an admission of bias. Individuals in today’s society know that it 
is considered wrong to discriminate on the basis of race, so even an individual who 
might actually be biased against the defendant because of the defendant’s race would 
almost surely answer such a question in the negative in order not to appear bigoted. 
Even an individual who truly disavows racism and racial discrimination might 
answer such a question in the negative, sincerely believing that he or she will not be 
biased against the defendant on account of the defendant’s race, when social 
cognition research suggests that all individuals, even the most egalitarian-minded on 
explicit measures, are implicitly biased on the basis of race.229 
I disagree, however, with Alschuler’s claim that voir dire into racial bias would 
be “minimally useful” in cases involving racial issues. Voir dire into racial bias can 
and should take the form of encouraging prospective jurors to think about racial 
bias in general. As discussed above, making race salient, whether through witness 
testimony or questions asked during voir dire, can inhibit the automatic associations 
that otherwise are likely to come into play when the defendant, the victim, or a 
witness is a member of a racially stereotyped group.230 
A second possible objection is more troubling and involves a burgeoning field 
of research on stereotype threat. As Song Richardson and Philip Atiba Goff explain, 
“[s]tereotype threat refers to the concern with confirming or being evaluated in 
terms of a negative stereotype about one’s group.”231 Most of us are aware of the 
concept of stereotype threat from Claude Steele’s research in the 1990s on African 
American undergraduate students faring poorly on standardized tests.232 Steele’s 
research showed that anxiety about confirming the stereotype that links African 
Americans to lack of intelligence results in African Americans doing poorly on 
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standardized tests.233 Subsequent research has confirmed that “[t]he concern with 
being negatively stereotyped often provokes anxiety, leading to physical and mental 
reactions that are difficult, if not impossible to volitionally control such as increased 
heart rate, fidgeting, sweating, averting eye gaze, and cognitive depletion—often 
leading to a reported inability to think clearly.”234 
Stereotype threat affects not only African Americans, but also anyone who 
belongs to a group that is negatively stereotyped. For example, women as a group 
suffer from the stereotype of not being good at math.235 When women are reminded 
of this stereotype, they tend to perform worse on math tests than when they are not 
reminded of the stereotype.236 Stereotype threat afflicts not just members of 
historically disadvantaged groups; it has also been shown to afflict White police 
officers concerned with being seen as racist.237 In Interrogating Racial Violence, Song 
Richardson and Phillip Atiba Goff document a study involving police officers with 
the San Jose, California Police Department.238 Surprisingly, the officers most 
concerned with not being or appearing to be racist were found to be quicker to use 
physical force to control situations involving Black suspects than officers who were 
not as concerned with how they were perceived by others.239 To explain these 
findings, Richardson and Goff theorize that an officer who fears that a suspect sees 
him as racist will believe that he cannot rely on moral authority to control the 
situation, and thus must resort to physical force.240 
If White police officers concerned about being seen as racist (i.e., officers 
concerned about the White-cop-as-racist stereotype) end up acting in more racially 
disparate ways than White police officers not so concerned about being seen as 
racist, should we worry that White jurors made aware of their own implicit biases 
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will become overly concerned with not appearing racist and end up acting in ways 
that disadvantage Black defendants and victims over White defendants and victims? 
While certainly possible, I do not think this is likely because there is no prevailing 
stereotype of the White racist juror whereas at least in some communities, there 
seems to be an existing stereotype of the White racist police officer. While certain 
communities may view White jurors with distrust, most Whites do not think of 
themselves as racist and, more importantly, do not think others generally view them 
as racist. Nonetheless, the research on stereotype threat suggests that attorneys 
attempting to raise awareness of implicit racial bias during voir dire must be careful 
not to trigger anxiety in prospective jurors that they might be seen as racist. 241 
Making jurors aware of their own implicit biases while not triggering stereotype 
threat is likely to be a difficult balancing act, somewhat like walking on a very thin 
tight rope. 
CONCLUSION 
In cases in which racial stereotypes about either the defendant, the victim, or 
a witness may influence the fact finder’s assessment of who was at fault, it is 
important for attorneys concerned about minimizing the risk of racial bias to be 
aware of the social science research on race salience. This research suggests that 
calling attention to race can help reduce racial bias in legal decision making. Voir 
dire into racial bias offers one way an attorney can make race salient to the jury. 
Calling attention to race can help minimize racial bias by encouraging jurors to 
consciously think about the impropriety of racial stereotyping. 
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